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In July 2015, Finland denied entry to several Russian parliamentary deputies, including 
the chair of the State Duma, who planned to participate in an OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly in Helsinki. These politicians were on the list of individuals under sanction by 
the European Union due to their role in the annexation of Crimea. In response, Nikolai 
Patrushev, secretary of Russia’s Federal Security Council and former head of the FSB, 
proposed an asymmetric penalty for Finland. He suggested a ban on the export of 
Russian wood to Finland, arguing that it would cause serious economic harm. However, 
the impact on Finland would be negligible since wood from Russia accounts for only 10 
percent of Finnish forestry imports and the supply is easily replaceable with wood from 
domestic or Baltic producers. By contrast, Russian forestry would suffer about a $584 
million loss in revenues from such a ban (based on 2014 figures). Nonetheless, none of 
the representatives of the Russian forestry sector openly objected to Patrushev’s 
proposal; Minister of Economic Development Alexey Ulyukaev only vaguely responded 
that the issue is a “subject for discussions.” This proposal and the muted reaction from 
the forestry industry both reflect the fact that in present-day Russia geopolitical rhetoric 
and posturing increasingly dominate economic considerations. More broadly, in an 
atmosphere of widespread public discrediting of Russian liberals for pro-Western 
orientations, any defense of free trade or complaints of the sector’s losses are summarily 
dismissed. 
 
This small episode illustrates the changing environment of economic decisionmaking in 
Russia. The top priorities of economic growth and development, which were promoted 
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vigorously during President Vladimir Putin’s first two terms, have been supplanted by 
ambitious geopolitical goals and smaller foreign policy slights. Granted, allocating 
economic resources for geopolitical aims is hardly new or unique. But the dominance of 
a foreign policy agenda over economic considerations has recently taken on new, 
sometimes major and sometimes petty, self-defeating forms in Russia. 
 
The early signs of the geopolitical turn in Russia’s economic policymaking first became 
apparent in September 2011, with the forced resignation of Alexei Kudrin. After eleven 
successful years as Russia’s minister of finance, Kudrin was fired from his post 
following his opposition to large increases in military expenditures. While some 
economically liberal decisionmakers have kept their jobs in Putin’s third term, Russia 
has also seen the rise of radical interventionists and statists, like the presidential advisor 
for Eurasian integration affairs, Sergey Glazyev. 
 
Since the annexation of Crimea and ensuing conflict with the West over Ukraine, the 
downgrading of economic priorities vis-à-vis foreign policy considerations has become 
increasingly apparent. In the years and months leading up to the crisis, Russia’s 
politicized use of energy exports (including ceasing gas delivery to key markets via 
Ukraine) already risked serious economic repercussions as it encouraged European 
customers to diversify energy sources. But more examples of geopolitically motivated 
economic policymaking arose at the time of the crisis, including the long-term 
subsidized gas contracts offered to Ukraine in December 2013, along with a $15 billion 
loan package and an additional $15 billion investment in Ukrainian securities. Hoping to 
stave off a free trade agreement between Ukraine and the EU, the Russian government 
employed its energy and financial resources to achieve foreign policy ends, namely 
preventing the reorientation of Ukraine toward the West.   
 
When Western countries imposed targeted sanctions on Russia, restricting travel and 
access to capital by political and economic elites and top Russian enterprises, the 
Kremlin responded with additional self-imposed countersanctions. These included an 
import ban on many foreign food products, which caused a steep rise of consumer 
prices and poor quality food substitutes at home. Other protectionist countermeasures 
included a new law on the preferential use of Russian software for state orders and in 
state-owned companies (adopted in 2015) and proposals to ban a range of medical 
equipment and contraceptives for state procurement. Attracting widespread media 
attention, the Russian government made a dramatic public spectacle of destroying 
banned food imports, even setting alight Dutch flower imports following a draft UN 
resolution put forth by the Netherlands and four other states to prosecute the parties 
responsible for shooting down flight MH17 over the Donbas in July 2014.   
 
Russia engaged in similar politically motivated bans occasionally in the past, like the 
2006 ban of wine imports from Moldova and Georgia, as well as temporary bans of meat 
from Poland and canned fish from Latvia. The current set of bans is not simply a 
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continuity of past behavior, however. These previous trade conflicts were occasional, 
issue-specific, and had a minor impact on Russia. The current actions, by contrast, are 
frequent, general, and have become mainstream policy. 
 
Some proposals are grand and unrealistic, such as Minister of Agriculture Alexander 
Tkachev’s announcement that Russia will seek to achieve 100% substitution of food 
imports by 2025 and increase funding for Russian agricultural producers during the next 
five years to $35 billion (2 trillion rubles). A major shift in budgetary allocations from 
social spending to the military (discussed below) is another large example. On a smaller 
scale, foreign cinema became a target of this new tit-for-tat mentality, when Minister of 
Culture Vladimir Medinskii insisted on the introduction of special taxes on foreign films 
shown in Russian movie theaters in order to promote domestic, patriotic films. 
Medinskii explained that the introduction of a VAT on foreign movies would harm 
Hollywood. In essence, such proposals allowed a small group of actors to enjoy 
concentrated symbolic and material benefits at the expense of many industrial sectors 
and the society at large. 
 
Putting geopolitics increasingly before economics has imposed concentrated costs on 
certain sectors, inconvenienced and depleted the purchasing power of a wide swath of 
Russian consumers, and put a substantial burden on the Russian economy. Against the 
background of a decline in global oil prices and economic contraction, this new 
approach to policymaking has contributed to great economic instability, eviscerated 
investor confidence, and generated $151 billion in capital flight in 2014 (two-and-a-half 
times the previous year’s figure).  
 
Ideas and Interests in a Geopolitical Policy Turn 
 
Why has geopolitics increasingly prevailed over economic considerations in Russian 
policymaking? In the spirit of neo-Kremlinology, one might argue that the geopolitical 
turn demonstrates the decisive victory of siloviki over their rivals, namely economic 
liberals, in the battle for Putin’s heart and mind. The roots of this victory, however, are 
not limited to Kremlin intrigues. They also stem from a new mindset and worldview. 
More specifically, they are based upon a conceptualization of global politics and 
economics as a zero-sum game, so that any gain for one side implies a loss for the other 
side. In a recent interview, Russia’s Federal Security Council Secretary, Nikolai 
Patrushev, claimed that the ultimate goal of U.S. economic policy is to take Europe and 
the Asia-Pacific region under American control, with “special attention devoted to 
undermining of the Russian economy and, especially, the financial system.” In effect, the 
world is divided into friends and enemies, and maximizing the losses of one’s enemies 
yields gains for oneself.  
 
The problem is that the international economy and global business operate in a more 
complex fashion and cannot be reduced to a zero-sum game. Economic policymaking is 
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complicated and requires serious policy expertise. The temptation to resort to this rather 
simplistic approach to economic policymaking exists elsewhere certainly, but the current 
attractiveness of this approach in Russia has grown substantially. In the Russian case, 
perceptions of an existential threat to the country and its rulers, as well as a desire for 
revenge for post-Cold War foreign policy losses, fuel these temptations. In the same 
interview, Patrushev asserted conspiratorially that the United States aimed at a takeover 
of Russian natural resources and that international sanctions were designed to 
encourage the overthrow of Russia’s political regime via a color revolution. He argued 
that a decline in Russians’ quality of life resulting from the sanctions would lead to mass 
protests and political upheaval. Thus, Russia must respond by all possible means. 
 
Given this zero-sum mentality, Russian authorities propose tit-for-tat responses to all 
real or imagined challenges from the West. It is not clear whether Russian leaders 
sincerely think food counter-sanctions or a ban on wood exports to Finland cause 
serious damage to European economies. However, the lack of resistance or protest from 
domestic losers (such as public sector workers or consumers) serves to legitimize this 
approach to economic decision-making. Given popular and industrial acquiescence, 
decision-makers are free to ignore the negative consequences of trade barriers, or the 
fact that the initiators of trade barriers may lose more than their counterparts. Counter-
sanctions and trade barriers instead have increasingly become an idee fixe in Russian 
politics, affecting many sectors.  
 
There are not only losers but also influential winners of this geopolitical turn in Russian 
economic foreign policy. Indeed the new Russian economic model is driven not only by 
foreign policy aims but also encouraged independently by a newly emerging coalition of 
special interest groups. First and foremost, the Russian military and defense industry 
have greatly benefited from a dramatic increase in funding. Despite Kudrin’s protests, 
military spending rose to 4.5 percent of Russian GDP from 2011 to 2014, markedly more 
than in the United States, China, and most European states.3 This rise, as predicted by 
Kudrin, has imposed a heavy burden on the Russian economy and the federal budget. 
Given the expected decline of budgetary revenues by $44 billion in 2015 alone, this 
emphasis has forced cuts in social and infrastructure spending. For 2016, the 
government announced the cutting of major public expenditures (excluding defense) by 
at least 10 percent. 
 
This new model portends significant fiscal stress. In the wake of forthcoming 
parliamentary elections (rescheduled for September 2016, three months earlier than 
initially planned) and the 2018 presidential election, Russia’s rulers may perceive an 
acute, time-sensitive need to buy the loyalty of their fellow citizens, while Russia’s 
Reserve Fund may be substantially drained by then. Hence, cutting social expenditures 
3 World Bank Indicators, 2015. For earlier discussion, see Brian Taylor, “Kudrin’s Complaint: Does Russia 
Face a Guns vs. Butter Dilemma?,” PONARS Policy Memo No. 254, June 2013. 
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is a risky game for the Kremlin despite a lack of visible social unrest. The extent to which 
the Kremlin will adhere to its current priorities remains unclear, and the tensions 
between conflicting goals in Russian economic policy may increase. 
 
The Politics of Subordinated Economic Policy 
 
In sum, economic development during Putin’s third presidential term appears more a 
means than an end in and of itself. This contrasts with Russia’s approach in the early 
2000s, not to mention with other countries that prioritize economic growth, like China 
and other BRIC countries. At present, the president’s reliance on economic experts is 
declining, and as a result the sometimes severe economic implications of government 
policies are not always appropriately gauged or prioritized. The episode of “Black 
Tuesday” of December 16, 2014, is one stark example, when the value of the Russian 
currency plummeted and the stock markets dramatically fell by about one quarter over 
several hours. 
 
Despite the subordinated status of economic policymaking in Russia, at least one policy 
area remains of primary importance—namely, the accumulation of hard currency 
reserves. But the privileging of foreign exchange accumulation also has a geopolitical 
edge. According to a recent Bloomberg report, the only economic matter that Putin 
discussed with his economic experts before the decision on Crimea was the amount of 
currency reserves in Russian state coffers. The president allegedly wanted reassurance 
that Russia could withstand the ensuing costs, including possible international 
sanctions. In February 2014, the total amount of international reserves—at $499 billion—
was evidently perceived as sufficient, greenlighting the Kremlin’s foreign policy agenda. 
By November 1, 2015, Russia had lost 25 percent of its international reserves, with only 
$375 billion remaining. Replenishing these reserves requires a commitment at the 
highest levels. During the second quarter of 2015, as global oil prices and Russia’s 
currency held steady, the Russian Central Bank announced plans to restore international 
reserves to the pre-Crimean level of $500 billion over the next five years.  
 
Given the expectations of future risks for the Russian economy and further foreign 
policy-driven economic costs, it is understandable that the Russian leadership wants to 
restore a monetary cushion (or springboard). As of yet, these foreign policy expenses 
have been affordable to a certain degree, but the current willingness to absorb the 
economic costs of growing foreign policy ambitions make the future of Russia’s 
economy highly uncertain. 
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